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This paper argues that two different types of a ﬁrm’s own extreme performance experiences—success and recovery—andtheir interactions can generate survival-enhancing learning. Although these types of experience often represent valuable
sources of useful learning, several important learning challenges arise when a ﬁrm has extremely limited prior experience
of the same type. Thus, we theorize that a certain threshold of a given type of experience is required before each type
of experience becomes valuable, with low levels of experience harming the organization. Furthermore, we propose that
success and recovery experience will interact to enhance each other’s value. These conditions can help overcome learning
challenges such as superstitious learning or learning from small samples. We investigate our ideas using a sample of the
U.S. commercial banks founded between 1984 and 1998. Our results indicate that both success and recovery experience of
a ﬁrm generate survival-enhancing learning, but only after a certain level of experience is reached. Furthermore, success
and recovery experience enhance each other’s learning value, consistent with the theories that emphasize the importance of
richer and contrasting experience in providing useful knowledge. Our framework advances organizational learning theory
by presenting a contingent model of the impact of success and recovery experience and their interaction.
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It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into
trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t
so. (Mark Twain)
Learning from unusual performance outcomes such
as success or failure experiences has increasingly drawn
scholarly attention (e.g., Baum and Dahlin 2007, Greve
2003b, Miner et al. 1999, Sitkin 1992). This emerg-
ing literature has signiﬁcantly expanded our horizons
in understanding how organizations learn from prior
experience above and beyond the conventional operat-
ing experience. The studies on this topic imply that
success and failure experiences have distinct charac-
teristics and features that set them apart from other
types of experience. However, this work often assumes
a traditional learning-curve perspective, which gener-
ally predicts a monotonic positive relationship between
the amount of experience and performance outcomes
(Argote and Epple 1990, Audia et al. 2000, Lant and
Montgomery 1987, Thornhill and Amit 2003). In this
paper, we explicitly consider the speciﬁc features of suc-
cess and failure and propose that this assumption does
not necessarily apply to learning from success and fail-
ure experience. We advance a framework in which the
impact of success- and failure-related experience will
depend upon two key factors: the level of experience and
the presence of the other type of experience.
We ﬁrst present theories about learning from two
types of extreme performance experience: success and
recovery. We deﬁne success experience as a ﬁrm’s
cumulative history of periods of exceptionally strong
performance. Recovery experience is a type of failure
experience deﬁned as occurring when a ﬁrm experiences
extremely poor performance but later overcomes it. We
argue that, although both success and recovery experi-
ence have great potential for generating useful learning,
they can also produce harmful learning outcomes in
the absence of sufﬁcient prior experience of the same
type. We then propose that such harmful learning out-
comes can be overcome through the accumulation of
more experience of the same type.
We predict this pattern based on theory that has long
emphasized that past experience is not always a good
958
Kim et al.: Organizational Learning from Extreme Performance Experience
Organization Science 20(6), pp. 958–978, © 2009 INFORMS 959
teacher and may lead to inaccurate models of the world,
inappropriate actions, and dysfunctional learning out-
comes (Levinthal and March 1993, March 1991, Miner
et al. 2001). Our framework highlights the concept that
extreme performance outcomes such as a ﬁrm’s own suc-
cess and recovery experience are inherently difﬁcult to
interpret and that they can even cause dangerous cog-
nitive biases, attribution errors, and superstitious learn-
ing until some threshold level of such experience is
reached (March et al. 1991). Without enough experience
to correct such biases, the dangers of inferential error
may far outweigh the potential beneﬁts of learning from
success or recovery (Denrell et al. 2004, March et al.
1991). In addition, the high salience of extreme perfor-
mance outcomes also increases the chances that they
will have a major impact on ﬁrm behavior even when
the lessons drawn from such experiences are inaccurate
(Haunschild and Miner 1997). Thus, instead of assuming
that learning from success and recovery experience will
necessarily be adaptive, we theorize that it will nega-
tively affect a ﬁrm’s performance when the ﬁrm has only
limited experience of the same type, but that it can gen-
erate positive outcomes at higher levels of experience.
The additional experience help ﬁrms draw more accu-
rate inferences and choose actions that are more likely
to have value.
We also propose that success and recovery experiences
will moderate the impacts of each other. The combina-
tion of the two types of experience offers a richer range
of linked prior actions and outcomes, as well as contrasts
between periods or episodes (Morris and Moore 2000),
which makes it possible to improve inferential learning.
The combined experience also generates a broader range
of potential actions that the ﬁrm can take (Haunschild
and Sullivan 2002). Thus, the combination of success
and recovery experience should enhance any positive
impact they offer. Our emphasis on the combination of
different experience types helps move the learning liter-
ature forward because prior studies have tended to focus
on only one type of experience at a time. Prior work
has provided evidence that ﬁrms can learn from different
types of experience, such as failure in naming strategy
(Chuang and Baum 2003), product recall (Haunschild
and Rhee 2004), or improvisational activities (Miner
et al. 2001), but it has not typically examined combined
experience effects. Our study offers a distinct perspective
in which two experience types associated with opposite
performance outcomes will enhance each other’s value.
We investigate our hypotheses using a sample of all
U.S. commercial banks founded between 1984 and 1998.
In testing our ideas, we follow the research tradition
of organizational learning literature that links organi-
zational experience with particular learning outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, we build on the survival-enhancing learn-
ing framework put forth by Baum and Ingram (1998),
which is deﬁned as a type of learning that occurs
when experience decreases an organization’s risk of
failure. We examine whether recovery and success expe-
rience and their interaction produce survival-enhancing
learning as our theory predicts. Survival is a particu-
larly appropriate learning outcome for this study context
because enhancing the prospect of survival is often a
new ﬁrm’s most critical goal.
Our ﬁndings provide strong support for the notion
that both recovery and success experience can generate
survival-enhancing learning. At the same time, our ﬁnd-
ings also show that recovery and success experiences
enhance the survival chances of banks only after a cer-
tain level of experience has been acquired, and that they
interact with each other to enhance the value of such
learning. This provides evidence for our theory that ﬁrms
face considerable learning challenges in drawing fruit-
ful lessons when they have limited extreme performance
experience, but that additional experience can help them
overcome these challenges.
This paper’s primary contributions to the literature
are fourfold. First, we move away from generic experi-
ence and instead probe the implications of two important
types of organizational experience: success and recovery.
Thus, this study advances our understanding of organiza-
tional experience above and beyond the focus on cumu-
lative operating experience, which tells us little about the
speciﬁc nature of a ﬁrm’s past experience.1 Second, we
provide evidence that when prior experience of the same
type is very low or absent, success and recovery expe-
rience can generate harmful learning outcomes, but that
additional experience can reverse this effect. This ﬁnding
advances the learning literature by underscoring prior
theories on learning challenges to develop a conditional
model of the impact of different levels of extreme perfor-
mance outcome experience. Third, our ﬁndings support
the theoretical prediction that the combination of differ-
ent types of experience can enhance useful learning. This
study represents an early study that compares and exam-
ines the interaction of multiple types of experience, and
to the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst effort
to explore the combined effects of success- and failure-
related experience. Finally, we advance the emerging
literature on organizational entrepreneurial learning by
explicating the impact of organization-level success and
recovery experiences in new ﬁrms.
Theory and Hypotheses
Learning from a Firm’s Own Success Experience
In developing our hypothesis on the impact of suc-
cess experience, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss existing theory,
which often proposes that it will have a positive learning
impact. We then focus on why success experience can
produce counterproductive learning in the presence of
very little prior success experience, and move onto why
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the addition of more success experience should reverse
this negative effect.
The behavioral theory of the ﬁrm has long recognized
that organizational reactions to success and failure rep-
resent an important potential mechanism through which
organizational learning occurs (Cyert and March 1992).
Boundedly rational managers often divide prior perfor-
mance outcomes into dichotomous judgment of success
and failure, and then modify their behavior based on the
categorization of prior performance (Cyert and March
1992, Greve 2003b, March and Simon 1958). Thus,
both success and failure can promote useful learning
processes.
In particular, success can serve as an indicator that
current strategies or actions are effective in the cur-
rent environment, and it can facilitate organizations in
retaining strategies and routines that contributed to their
success (Audia et al. 2000, Greve 1998, Kraatz 1998,
Schwab 2007). This can reduce wasteful organizational
search efforts and improve efﬁciency and performance
(Greve 2003a, Levinthal and March 1993). Furthermore,
because success experience is highly salient, it draws
attention within the organization and inspires conﬁdence
in ongoing learning activities (Schwab and Miner 2008).
This in turn can point to promising areas for further
search (Ocasio 1997, Simon 1997) and stimulate slack
search, which can lead to novel and useful knowledge
and capabilities (Cyert and March 1992). These potential
beneﬁts of success experience are not only well docu-
mented in the literature but also quite intuitive. How-
ever, learning from success is also subject to behavioral
and cognitive biases and errors (Sitkin 1992, Tversky
and Kahneman 1974), which are especially problematic
when ﬁrms have only limited prior success experience.
Thus, we propose that the potential values of success
experience may not lead to useful learning until sufﬁ-
cient levels of success experience have been reached to
overcome these dangers.
Danger of Limited Success Experience. When a ﬁrm
tries to learn from a very few prior success events, it can
be led into several learning processes that can generate
harmful rather than useful outcomes. Success is often a
noisy signal of the effectiveness of prior actions; e.g.,
success can be a result of simple luck or persistent use of
a high-risk strategy (Denrell 2005). Thus, it is not easy
to establish an accurate causal relationship between a
success and its antecedents (Denrell et al. 2004, Minsky
2006). Nonetheless, managers tend to make an implicit
assumption that success is a result of the effectiveness
of their prior actions even when they do not have a clear
understanding of what caused the success (Miller and
Ross 1975, Van de Ven and Polley 1992, Weiner 1986).
In addition, managers tend to assign unwarranted
weight to success experience and to downplay signs
of poor performance in other parts of the organization
because they want to portray themselves as successful
managers (Audia et al. 2000, Kunda 1999). This can
lead to an oversampling of success experience that can
cause errors in inference (Denrell 2003, Hayward 2002).
This tendency to place more credence on success expe-
rience than its true value warrants presents a danger
of superstitious learning. This form of learning occurs
when ﬁrms take actions based on a mistaken identiﬁca-
tion of speciﬁc routines and causal processes that con-
tributed to experienced success and/or fail to distribute
proper credits to each routine’s contribution to success
(Denrell et al. 2004, Levinthal and March 1993).
These dangers can occur when a ﬁrm tries to learn
from any level of success experience, but the potential
biases and errors of interpreting success are most likely
to occur among managers of ﬁrms with limited prior
success experience. The learning literature suggests that
learning from limited experience presents signiﬁcant
learning challenges because ﬁrms must rely on a small
number of events in inferring what actions generated
which outcomes (March et al. 1991). The small sam-
ple size increases the margin of error and the potential
biases in interpreting prior success events, thus raising
the probability that ﬁrms will derive incorrect conclu-
sions from the experience and/or engage in superstitious
learning (Denrell 2003).
Speciﬁcally, limited prior success experience can lead
ﬁrms to inaccurately attribute their success to routines
or strategies that, in truth, did very little to produce the
success. The incorrect attributions arising from insufﬁ-
cient information will lead them to adopt suboptimal,
irrelevant, or even harmful actions and routines, conse-
quently undermining their viability (Kim and Finkelstein
2009, Levitt and March 1988). Investing in incorrect
routines is especially costly to ﬁrms constrained by
limited resources and operating funds (Baker and Nel-
son 2005). Consistent with these arguments, Haleblian
and Finkelstein (1999) found a U-shaped relationship
between acquisition experience and acquisition perfor-
mance; i.e., low levels of acquisition experience nega-
tively inﬂuenced performance until a ﬁrm accumulated
a certain level of acquisition experience. They attributed
the negative impact of acquisition experience to ﬁrms’
inappropriate generalizations from insufﬁcient experi-
ence in the speciﬁc domain of acquisitions. We similarly
argue that limited success experience will lead ﬁrms to
overgeneralize the value of actions taken before the suc-
cess without a careful analysis of causal factors, a learn-
ing process that can harm the ﬁrm as a whole (March
1999b). In sum, ﬁrms with limited success experience
can make mistakes in identifying actions that should be
repeated (trial and error learning) and/or in constructing
accurate cognitive maps of the causal world in which
they operate (inferential learning).
The danger of superstitious learning is exacerbated by
the overconﬁdence that early success instills in the orga-
nization and its managers and stakeholders (Cooper et al.
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1988). Success increases conﬁdence in the prior actions
(Audia et al. 2000, Sitkin 1992), and encourages inter-
pretation that is consistent with prior assumptions rather
than being useful for learning from current experience
(Fiske and Taylor 1991). Thus, managers often infer
from their initial success that their ﬁrm is more capable
than it really is, which can lead to ill-informed strategies
as well as inattention to threats. Encouraged by initial
success, they may also act more boldly and take more
ill-considered risk, increasing the risk of failure of their
ﬁrm. In short, managers’ overconﬁdence due to a few
early strong successes can produce quick actions driven
by superstitious learning, thus exposing their ﬁrms to a
high risk of failure. Comments by a senior manager at a
small California ethnic bank that started its operation in
the late 1990s illustrate this danger:2
When we ﬁrst started, much of our business came from
new immigrants [from a foreign country], mostly small
business loans and personal credits. Our operating results
during the ﬁrst couple of years exceeded everybody’s
expectations. So, we continued to focus on that customer
group until recently. But, in retrospect, it was a pretty
risky strategy because they are a high-risk group. This
strategy also began to limit our growth. We are not doing
it any longer.
Overall, the combination of superstitious learning,
overconﬁdence, and overestimation of ﬁrm capabilities
derived from limited success experience is highly likely
to generate harmful learning outcomes.
Positive Learning Value from Additional Success
Experience. We theorize that additional success expe-
rience will mitigate the negative effects of initial suc-
cess experiences. As ﬁrms experience new and separate
episodes of success that were achieved in different areas
and contexts, they gain new information that can help
them avoid the behavioral and cognitive biases associ-
ated with the initial limited experience. Stated differ-
ently, a greater amount of success experience allows
ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a richer array of actions and out-
comes, and to contrast aspects of each phase with one
another. This, in turn, makes it possible for them to
develop a more comprehensive and valid causal map
and richer repertoire of actions (March et al. 1991).
Additional success experience allows ﬁrms to improve
their chances of correctly identifying the routines and
strategies that are responsible for their prior success
and repeat actions that were truly effective. Firms can
develop a deeper understanding by analyzing the pat-
terns in the different success periods and the conse-
quences of prior success-driven learning. Thus, higher
levels of success experience can reduce learning biases
and errors, and increase the chance of harvesting value
from prior successes (Levinthal and March 1993, March
et al. 1991).
The valid identiﬁcation of actual causes of suc-
cess experiences can also permit more efﬁcient use of
resources. If a ﬁrm identiﬁes routines that truly “work,”
it can focus more on perfecting those than on search-
ing for potential alternatives (March 1991). Thus, it will
become more proﬁcient in performing activities that gen-
uinely produce value, which in turn can improve its
operating efﬁciency and performance. This can be ben-
eﬁcial for three reasons. First, it allows the ﬁrm to
save resources that would be otherwise spent on costly,
random search. Second, it can help the ﬁrm focus on
key operational issues that have direct bearing on ﬁrm
growth and survival. Third, it can decrease the level of
risk to which a ﬁrm is exposed by limiting unfruitful
exploration (Greve 1998).
Behavioral theories have traditionally argued that suc-
cess can slow down overall organizational search and
experimentation if most search is problem-driven (Cyert
and March 1992). Success does not completely elimi-
nate organizational search activities, however. Repeated
success can allow ﬁrms to generate higher proﬁts and
stronger cash ﬂow, which can help them accumulate
slack resources that in turn spur slack search (Baum
et al. 2005, Cyert and March 1992). Slack search can
help ﬁrms incrementally improve upon existing routines
without disrupting core operations or negatively inﬂu-
encing performance (Greve 2003b, Levinthal and March
1993). In addition, slack search can generate innova-
tions that enhance the ﬁrm’s adaptive capabilities (Greve
2003a). Repeated success, then, can encourage managers
and entrepreneurs to increase some search activities that
improve existing routines and to explore new areas, and
create a richer set of options for action.
In sum, we expect that a limited number of early suc-
cesses will be harmful to a ﬁrm’s performance and that
the value of success experience will be realized only
after new ﬁrms experience a threshold level of successes.
This implies an inverse U-shaped relationship between
success experience and organizational failure, leading to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. There will be an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the amount of success experience
of a focal bank and the failure rate of the bank.
Learning from a Firm’s Own Recovery Experience
Research on organizational learning has suggested that
ﬁrms can learn fruitfully from their own and others’ fail-
ure experiences (Chuang and Baum 2003, Miner et al.
1999). Failure-related constructs include many events
above and beyond the traditional concepts of survival
and dissolution. Consistent with this, learning schol-
ars have recently begun to explore learning from dif-
ferent failure-related experiences such as product recall
(Haunschild and Rhee 2004) and industry-level near-
failure (Kim and Miner 2007). Our study advances this
emerging literature by theorizing about how ﬁrms learn
from their own recovery experience. We deﬁne this type
Kim et al.: Organizational Learning from Extreme Performance Experience
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of failure experience as occurring when a ﬁrm faces
imminent failure due to a critical performance decline
but later substantially improves its performance above
an acceptable level (Kim and Miner 2007).
By deﬁnition, recovery experience involves periods
of extremely low performance followed by strong per-
formance improvement, which offer useful contrasts
to support fruitful learning. As ﬁrms overcome life-
threatening situations, they may abandon or revise
ineffective routines (Wiseman and Bromiley 1996),
implement new strategies (Barr et al. 1992), or try
to develop new capabilities (Ocasio 1995). Corporate
renewals or turnarounds can represent recovery expe-
riences, for example. The lessons drawn from actions
taken to escape from failure can allow ﬁrms to respond
more effectively to similar problems they may encounter
in the future, or help them avoid experiencing another
problem altogether (Mezias and Glynn 1993). Indeed,
recovery experience may have an even higher learning
value than success by offering pre–post contrasts and
apparent working solutions to prior threats, as well by
engendering strong reactions of organizational members
(Kim and Miner 2007). However, like success experi-
ence, recovery experience is subject to several prob-
lems that may generate negative, nonadaptive learning
outcomes when ﬁrms do not have sufﬁcient recovery
experience.
Dangers of Limited Recovery Experience. Despite the
intuitive appeal of recovery experience as a poten-
tial source of useful learning, limited recovery experi-
ence can produce counterproductive learning outcomes.
The potential dangers of learning from limited recovery
experience mirror many of the dangers of learning from
limited success experience, but there are also some dan-
gers speciﬁc to learning from recovery. As we discussed
in the case of success experience, generalizing from lim-
ited experience can lead to superstitious learning (Huber
1991, Levitt and March 1988). Paradoxically, this danger
may be exacerbated by the very characteristics that make
recovery experience an attractive source of learning.
When faced with a problem, boundedly rational man-
agers tend to adopt a preexisting solution that they used
in the past rather than develop a new solution (Levitt and
March 1988). This makes recovery experience particu-
larly attractive because recovery experience provides a
working solution to a threat that can be potentially used
again when a similar problem should arise (Kim and
Miner 2007). If ﬁrms take speciﬁc actions to deal with
threats, they will often see them as working solutions
to the perceived threats, even if these actions did not
cause the recovery. Thus, managers with initial recov-
ery experiences are tempted to reuse the lessons drawn
from the experience (Kunda 1999). They will actively
seek to implement the same actions when they face prob-
lems in the future, hoping to replicate similar outcomes
(Levinthal and Rerup 2006). However, because indi-
vidual problems often require unique solutions, blindly
applying the solutions learned from a small sample of
prior recovery experience without a clear grasp of the
problem at hand can produce harmful learning outcomes
(March et al. 1991). Misplaced conﬁdence in these
apparent solutions can also take attention away from
genuine threats at hand (Ocasio 1997). Thus, although
recovery experience seems to provide working solutions
to serious managerial problems, this very feature can
increase the chances of harmful learning outcomes in the
presence of little prior recovery experience.
Furthermore, severe performance distress is likely to
elicit much attention from the managers within a ﬁrm
because it can escalate into an even more undesirable
consequence—ﬁrm failure. Successfully fending off a
distress situation draws even more attention from man-
agers who enthusiastically seek opportunities to share
their tales of victory, in contrast to stigmatizing out-
comes such as bankruptcy (Miner et al. 1999). This
combination enhances the emotional appeal of recovery
experience, which in turn encourages managers to accept
their experience at its face value and take action based
on its seemingly apparent value even if their limited
experience does not allow them to draw valid lessons.
Positive Learning Value from Additional Recovery
Experience. As with success experience, the impact of
the errors and biases associated with learning from
recovery experience will diminish as ﬁrms gain recovery
experience sufﬁcient to allow them to correct these mis-
takes. The longitudinal comparison of multiple recovery
events can engender useful learning by helping man-
agers establish a more well-informed understanding of
causal relationships between variables that may have
contributed to their experience. An isolated or limited
level of recovery experience may be simply dismissed
as an abnormal event. However, additional recovery
episodes can increase the chances that a ﬁrm will antici-
pate potential threats, more accurately evaluate the risks
of future problems, and act on more realistic assessments
of the threats of future problems, consequently lowering
the risk of failure (March et al. 1991).
A record of failure-related experiences not only makes
it more likely that the ﬁrm can validate apparent solu-
tions to prior challenges, but also allows the ﬁrm to
accumulate a repertoire of strategies that are truly effec-
tive in fending off certain types of distress (Sitkin 1992).
These tested actions are particularly valuable because
they arise from a ﬁrm’s own experience, are relevant to
the context in which the ﬁrm operates, and are closely
aligned with the ﬁrm’s resources and capabilities (Levitt
and March 1988). In sum, repeated recovery episodes
can provide a toolkit of tested working solutions that a
ﬁrm can deploy when similar problems arise, but also
provide sufﬁcient context to increase the chances that the
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solutions will be relevant and inferences from recoveries
will be appropriate. This notion was implied by a senior
manager from a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign bank:3
We are in the business of taking risks, so bad things
are bound to happen. Bad loan accounts and miscalcu-
lated investments are facts of life for banks. We cannot
possibly come up with a new solution every time we
have a problem. It is impractical and dangerous because
we don’t know whether it will work. So, it is extremely
important to keep track of our past problems and how we
took care of them. We’ve created action templates from
our experience, and we expect managers to follow them
when a similar problem arises.
In sum, these theories imply that recovery experience
will produce harmful learning outcomes for ﬁrms when
they have a small amount of recovery experience, but
that once sufﬁcient levels are reached, recovery experi-
ence will have a positive learning impact. This leads us
to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There will be an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the amount of recovery experience
of a focal bank and the failure rate of the bank.
The Interaction Between a Firm’s Own Success and
Recovery Experience
Firms acquire different types of experience throughout
their histories, and each type of experience provides
opportunities for both useful and destructive learning
outcomes, conditioned on the level of the same type of
experience. Our ﬁnal hypothesis proposes another con-
dition that should shape the learning potential for suc-
cess and failure experience: the joint impact of the two
types of experience on each other. To our knowledge, the
interaction between different organizational experience
types has not been explored in depth in previous studies
on organizational learning. However, work on different
sources of information has underscored that in some set-
tings different sources of information may work together
to enhance each other’s impact on behavior (Taylor and
Greve 2006). Haleblian et al. (2006) reported that the
interaction of the number of prior acquisitions and the
performance feedback from prior acquisitions affects the
likelihood of making subsequent acquisitions. This ﬁnd-
ing provided evidence that two information sources—
i.e., prior experience of making acquisitions and how
well ﬁrms performed in the prior acquisitions—jointly
shape future acquisition behavior. Haunschild and Beck-
man (1998) found that the properties of several informa-
tion sources jointly determined ﬁrm behavior, with some
serving as complements and others as substitutes. We
advance this line of research by theorizing and testing
how the presence of both success and recovery experi-
ence will affect the value of each type of experience.
Speciﬁcally, we theorize that in this context the two
types of experience should enhance rather than substitute
for each other’s impact, helping overcome limitations of
each source of learning.
In the previous sections, we predicted challenges and
harmful learning outcomes when ﬁrms have some suc-
cess and recovery experience but lack sufﬁcient prior
experience of the same type to overcome the dangers
of limited experience. Emerging organizational learning
research increasingly argues that ﬁrms can learn more
effectively and overcome learning dangers when they
learn from diverse experiences (March et al. 1991, Zollo
and Winter 2002). For example, Haunschild and Sullivan
(2002) found that airlines that experienced more het-
erogeneous causes of prior errors suffered a lower sub-
sequent number of errors and attributed this ﬁnding to
the beneﬁts of diverse experience. Schilling et al. (2003)
found that variation in experience improved learning
rates in a problem-solving experimental setting. These
studies build on classic theories of statistical inference
that suggest that high variability in a ﬁrm’s experience
helps it to make more accurate inferences about actions
and outcomes. Similarly, we propose that success and
recovery experience will enhance each others’ value.
From the learning perspective, recovery and success
experience represent a particularly promising combina-
tion of diverse experiences. We have noted that success
and recovery experience are both likely to draw a great
deal of organizational attention. In particular, the pres-
ence of little prior experience of a given type will tend to
pull decision-makers’ attention in one extreme direction,
creating biases in interpretation and generating poten-
tially harmful actions as outlined above. However, this
problem can be mitigated by combining opposite types
of experience that can help balance decision-makers’
cognitive maps. Theories of associative learning sug-
gest that events or ideas can be better understood when
contrasting information is present (Sternberg 2003).
The availability of contrasting information enhances the
effectiveness of experiential learning by reducing causal
ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding the experi-
enced outcomes (Morris and Moore 2000). When learn-
ing occurs from both recovery and success experiences,
a ﬁrm gains an opportunity to compare information
about both patterns. It can cross-check for consistency in
activities related to avoiding failure and achieving suc-
cess with a richer palate of events and actions to draw
on for causal models of its own history. These ongo-
ing comparisons permit the ﬁrm to gain a larger library
of possibly valuable activities available to deploy if sur-
prising external events should occur (Feldman 1989,
Walsh and Ungson 1991). This will also help the ﬁrm to
identify successful and unsuccessful routines more accu-
rately and to improve its theories about actions leading
to success or failure.
We have argued that it is difﬁcult to learn effectively
from success or recovery experience alone because the
small sample size for such rare experience limits its
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ability to draw valid inferences. The paucity of contex-
tual information for interpretation induces more error
in interpreting the events (March et al. 1991). We have
previously contended that these potential challenges can
be overcome by accumulating more of the same type
of experience. Valid inferential learning from experi-
ence requires estimating the underlying distribution from
which the experience is drawn (March et al. 1991). As
the sample size increases, expected errors decrease, and
ﬁrms can derive more reliable and valid lessons. How-
ever, it is not always possible to increase the sample
size when ﬁrms learn from rare forms of experience
such as recovery and unusual success. It is unlikely that
ﬁrms actively seek to accumulate failure-related experi-
ence such as recovery experiences. The presence of both
types of experience offers an alternative source of rel-
evant information and allows ﬁrms to triangulate their
ﬁndings and complement the deﬁciencies of each type
of experience.
Learning exclusively from either success or distress
also can lead a ﬁrm to a myopic learning process, in
which organizations focus on knowledge with short-
term or local value but limit their search for knowl-
edge that could have greater value (Levinthal and March
1993). Firms learning from success and recovery expe-
rience alone may focus on apparently successful prior
actions, in each case failing to search more broadly for
possible better solutions. Such unbalanced and limited
search behavior may result in the adoption of subop-
timal routines or even hurt long-term performance or
survival (Gupta et al. 2006, March 1991). Consistent
with these arguments, prior models have suggested that
a more precise cognitive map arising from contrasting
experiences will also lead to more intelligent search
behavior (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000). Comments by
a senior bank manager whom we interviewed illustrate
this possibility:4
We did very well during the past few years, mainly
thanks to the hot real estate market here on the West
Coast. We are likely to continue to focus on that market
next year. It is hard to turn your back on proﬁt opportu-
nities. But there are some concerns about the increasing
risk proﬁle of this market segment, and some believe we
could repeat the same crisis we experienced when the
real estate market collapsed ﬁfteen years ago [the early
’90s]. But I don’t think there will be a serious crisis this
time even if the market crashes because we are not sim-
ply banking on the real estate boom. We are much better
equipped to deal with a similar crisis. After all, many of
us paid our dues.
This remark underscores the potential for enhanced
value of learning from both success and recovery expe-
rience over either alone. The manager perceived prior
crises as helping the ﬁrm avoid pitfalls of the current
success and be better prepared for potential future crises.
The arguments above imply that success experience
and recovery experience will each enhance the learning
value of the other. Thus, we propose that the joint pres-
ence of success and recovery experience should produce
more positive survival-enhancing learning than the pres-
ence of either experience alone.
Hypothesis 3. Success and recovery experience in-
teract with each other such that the greater one type
of experience of a focal bank, the more negative the
relationship between the other type of experience and
the failure rate of the bank.
Methods
Study Setting and Sample
We explored our research questions using a sample con-
sisting of all of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC)-insured U.S. commercial banks founded
during the 15-year period between January 1, 1984, and
December 31, 1998. We identiﬁed 2,724 banks char-
tered during the study period; of those, 28 banks were
dropped from the sample due to incomplete data. Dur-
ing the study period, 259 of the remaining 2,696 banks
failed, and 905 banks were right-censored from the sam-
ple because of mergers and acquisitions; the remaining
1,532 banks remained active as of December 31, 1998.
We obtained the bank ﬁnancial and demographic data
from IDC Financial Publishing (IDC), a commercial
banking industry analysis ﬁrm. We collected additional
demographic and regulatory data from sources includ-
ing the SNL Financial’s Bank Regulatory Database, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Ofﬁce of Comptroller of the
Currency, and the FDIC.
To test theories about how ﬁrms have learned from
recovery and success experience since their founding,
we needed a complete history of banks’ ﬁnancial data
to account for all of the experience each bank had accu-
mulated since its founding. The complete ﬁnancial data
were not available before 1984, so we could not measure
the complete history of recovery and success experience
of banks chartered before 1984. Thus, we used a cohort
sample of banks chartered since 1984 to accurately cap-
ture the complete history of experiences of the banks in
the sample. Because these cohort banks were new ﬁrms
when they entered the sample, they started with no prior
organization-level success or recovery experience. Thus,
they offer a chance to explore the impact of these expe-
rience types in the presence of little or no prior expe-
rience and to test theory about the impact of additional
experience of the same type.
This setting also provides several other valuable fea-
tures for this study. The banking industry offers stan-
dardized performance ratings that have direct bearing on
ﬁrm survival. The historic regulation of the industry pro-
vides rich data on performance hierarchy (i.e., strong
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performance, normal performance, or distress). The sys-
tem is objectively set by industry norms using the
CAMEL rating, a composite index that measures the
ﬁnancial soundness and performance of banking insti-
tutions that is widely accepted in the banking industry.
This industry feature makes it possible to objectively
deﬁne success and distress of banks.
Although the failure rates of new ﬁrms in the bank-
ing industry (approximately 10% for our entire sample
period) are not extremely high, failure is a very impor-
tant issue for this industry. Bank failure is costly not
only for the failed banks and their direct stakeholders
but also for society as a whole because federal and state
governments must assume much of the loss by paying
out deposit insurance claims with taxpayers’ money. Fur-
thermore, banks pay a great deal of attention to issues
that could increase their risk of failure because banks
that are perceived to be at high risk of failure are sub-
ject to many competitive disadvantages, including higher
borrowing rates, funding problems, frequent regulatory
sanctions, and difﬁculties in attracting deposits due to
low customer conﬁdence (Hanc 1997). Our ﬁeld data
and industry histories provide ample anecdotal evidence
that bankers pay close attention to learning and to devel-
oping strategies that will minimize the chance of failure,
and the relatively low failure rates of banks are often
attributed to these learning efforts (FDIC 1997).
The possibility of failure is especially salient for new
banks because new banks pass through a period of ﬁnan-
cial fragility during which they are more vulnerable to
failure than established institutions (DeYoung and Hasan
1998, Hunter and Srinivasan 1990). Thus, the opera-
tional focus of new banks often involves improving their
chances of survival rather than high proﬁtability by rais-
ing their capital level, building up ﬁnancial reserves,
educating employees for risk management, and building
a safety network (DeYoung 2003). Because survival is
such a pressing issue for new banks, this industry offers
an appropriate context for studying survival-enhancing
learning.
Finally, the study setting enhances the broader value
of this research. Because the banking industry is a criti-
cal part of the national economic system, its performance
has a broad impact as evidenced by the massive impacts
of the recent subprime mortgage crisis on the banking
system and the world economy; this makes the bank-
ing industry an important setting for studying survival-
enhancing learning. Furthermore, although this is a
very mature, well-established industry, entrepreneurial
activity continuously occurs through many newly char-
tered banks, as evidenced by the more than 2,700 new
banks founded during our study period alone. Industry
observers consider these new entrants to be important for
maintaining the viability of the entire industry because
they help restore competition in local markets that have
experienced consolidation and serve as credit replace-
ments for small businesses whose banks were closed or
acquired (DeYoung 1999).
Analysis of Bank Failure
The dependent variable is the unobserved hazard rate of
failure of banks in the sample. Banks were considered
to have failed if they were (1) liquidated or (2) merged
with another bank with FDIC ﬁnancial assistance. Fail-
ure was recorded quarterly at the end of each quarter.
Liquidating or closing a bank is very costly, not only
for the banks that failed but also for the general pub-
lic because the FDIC must pay the deposit insurance
claims with federal funds. Thus, when a bank is on the
verge of failing due to serious ﬁnancial or managerial
problems, the FDIC typically searches for a potential
acquirer to avoid liquidation, and they provide ﬁnan-
cial assistance to the acquiring bank to incentivize the
transaction. Banks acquired with ﬁnancial assistance are
virtually dissolved in most cases, and only their assets
and/or branches are absorbed by the acquiring banks.
Thus, the FDIC formerly classiﬁes such transactions as
bank failure (FDIC 1997). Voluntary, non-FDIC-assisted
mergers and acquisitions that were not associated with
failure were not treated as failures but as being right-
censored.
In our sample, 57% of the banks were right-censored
without experiencing any event by the end of the study
period (1,532/2,696 total banks in the sample), and 34%
of the banks (905/2,696) were censored from the sam-
ple due to an event other than failure (i.e., acquisition).
This makes it important to use a statistical technique
that provides unbiased failure rate estimates by taking
into account right-censored cases. Survival analysis uses
all of the information provided by right-censored cases
and avoids parameter estimation bias caused by right-
censored observations.
We used a piecewise exponential model, which pro-
vides a ﬂexible functional form of age dependence
(Baum and Ingram 1998, Yamaguchi 1991). The piece-
wise exponential model splits the age of the ﬁrms in the
sample into predeﬁned age segments and assumes that
the hazard rates are constant within each time segment,
but it allows the hazard function to vary between the
time segments (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). We cre-
ated three age segments (i.e., zero to four years, ﬁve to
eight years, and nine years or older) because our prelim-
inary data analysis, including Kaplan-Meyer estimation,
detected two discontinuities in hazard rates correspond-
ing approximately to the fourth and ninth years after
founding. These age periods are consistent with prior
banking research (DeYoung 2003). We also estimated
our models using different cutoff points and obtained
consistent results.
To examine whether our ﬁndings are sensitive
to model speciﬁcation, we estimated models using
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Gompertz, Weibull, and simple exponential (without
time pieces) models, which use different parametric
assumptions of age dependence on failure rates. We also
estimated models using the semiparametric Cox propor-
tional hazards model. Although our data do not satisfy
the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox model,
these estimations can shed light on the results obtained
from the parametric models (Cleves et al. 2002). Results
for these models with alternative speciﬁcations were
consistent with the results obtained from the piecewise
exponential model, indicating the fact that our ﬁndings
are not an artifact of a speciﬁc parametric assumption.
Independent Variables
Success Experience. We deﬁne a success experience
as occurring when a bank in the sample experienced
unusually strong performance. A bank’s performance
level was measured by its CAMEL rating, a compos-
ite index that assesses the ﬁve most important areas of
ﬁnancial and management performance of a bank: cap-
ital risk, asset quality, margins, earnings, and leverage.
We use CAMEL ratings that were computed by IDC.5
The IDC CAMEL rating is highly consistent with the
ofﬁcial CAMEL rating maintained by the FDIC, which
is not available to the public, because they are computed
based on the same principles, and it has been shown
to have high predictive validity for assessing the likeli-
hood of bank failure (IDC Financial Publishing 2002).
We also compared the IDC CAMEL ratings with the
VERIBANC rating, another widely used bank rating
system, and we found that they are highly consistent.
The IDC CAMEL rating ranges from 1 (the lowest) to
300 (the highest). The IDC CAMEL rating of 200 or
higher corresponds to the highest FDIC CAMEL rating
category,6 which the banking industry considers to be
very high (Curry et al. 2001). Thus, a bank was deﬁned
as being successful when it obtained a CAMEL rating
of 200 or higher in a given quarter. Although this thresh-
old is widely accepted for deﬁning success and/or strong
performance in the banking industry, we performed a
sensitivity analysis to examine whether our results are
robust across different cutoff points for deﬁning success.
Speciﬁcally, we estimated models with success variables
deﬁned by two different cutoff values around 200 (e.g.,
190 and 210), and we obtained consistent results.
Experience accumulates over time, but organizational
learning research indicates that lessons learned from past
experience may not increase monotonically because the
value of such lessons may depreciate over time (Argote
1999). Prior studies usually discounted past experience,
using a prespeciﬁed functional form such as the age of
the experience. Similarly, we discounted success expe-
rience, using the age of each experience (Ingram and
Baum 1997). We also estimated models using experience
variables that were discounted by alternative discount
factors—i.e., no discount, age-squared (age2), and age-
square root (
√
age—to examine the robustness of our
ﬁndings. We found consistent results from these alterna-
tive speciﬁcations. Because success experience was con-
structed based on quarterly data, the age of experience
was measured quarterly. Thus, success experience of a
bank i at time t was operationalized as the discounted
sum of the total number of quarters in which the bank i
recorded a CAMEL rating of 200 or higher since its
charter tc:
success experience
=
t−1∑
j=tc
success experiencesij/discount factor
where tc is the quarter that bank i was chartered, success
experienceij is an indicator of whether bank i experi-
enced success in quarter j , and discount factor is the age
of the experience.
Recovery Experience. We deﬁne a recovery experi-
ence as occurring when a bank that experiences a critical
ﬁnancial distress that puts it at high risk of failure over-
comes the crisis and returns a normal level of perfor-
mance. The CAMEL rating is more appropriate than
other performance indicators for measuring recovery
experience because it is directly associated with the
risk of a bank’s failure (Meyer and Vaughan 2000).
A bank with a CAMEL rating below 125 is considered
to be under severe ﬁnancial strain and at high risk of
failure. The IDC CAMEL ratings below 125 correspond
to 4 or 5 on FDIC’s ofﬁcial CAMEL rating scale, and
FDIC classiﬁes banks with an FDIC CAMEL rating of
4 or 5 as being severely distressed (Curry et al. 2001).
This level is a well-accepted indicator of bank distress
in the industry (Ofﬁce of Inspector General 2006).
Building on the banking literature and prior studies
on organizational learning (Gunther and Moore 2000,
Kim and Miner 2007), we operationalized each recovery
experience as occurring when a bank’s CAMEL rating
drops below 125 for at least two consecutive quarters,
then moves up to a rating higher than 125. It is very
undesirable for a bank to receive a low rating for an
extended period of time because a persistently low rating
will eventually trigger regulatory intervention that may
result in a closure or a forced merger. Thus, receiving a
low rating for more than two quarters usually indicates
that the bank has serious managerial issues.
Recovery experience for bank i at time t was opera-
tionalized as the discounted sum of the total number of
individual recovery experiences that a bank has accumu-
lated since its charter tc:
recovery experience
=
t−1∑
j=tc
recovery experienceij/discount factor	
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Control Variables
We included an extensive set of control variables to sys-
tematically account for potential alternative factors that
could affect the failure of banks in the sample other than
organizational learning.
Organizational Characteristics. This set of variables
helps control for potential heterogeneity among banks.
We included bank size, measured by the logarithm of
the total assets of a bank because ﬁrm size can affect
the survival chances of a ﬁrm (Baum 1996). The char-
ter type of a bank determines the type of regulations
and statutory constraints that the bank is subject to,
which in turn inﬂuences the various aspects of the bank’s
operation and characteristics. Thus, we included char-
ter type, an indicator of whether a bank was federally
chartered (coded 1) or state chartered (coded 0). Capital
level can also signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the probability of
bank failure (Dietrich and James 1983). Undercapital-
ized banks are more likely to fail when a serious man-
agement and/or ﬁnancial problem (e.g., a large sum of
default loans) arises. Thus, we added capital asset ratio,
measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets,
to control for capital risk. Because the ﬁnancial perfor-
mance of a bank has a direct impact on the survival of
the bank, we included the logarithm of CAMEL rating
to capture a bank’s ﬁnancial performance and condi-
tions. CAMEL rating was log-transformed because we
assumed a decreasing marginal effect of the CAMEL
rating on failure rates.7 Using the CAMEL rating with-
out log-transformation did not change the results. A high
CAMEL rating generally produces positive effects on
bank survival, and the vast majority of failed banks
(>90%) in our sample had a very low rating (0–125)
at the time of failure. However, a very small number
of banks with a very high rating also failed. Thus, we
included high CAMEL failure, a ﬁrm-level dummy vari-
able that indicates banks that failed with a CAMEL rat-
ing of 200 or higher, to control for the possibility that
these banks are systematically different from other banks
in the sample. A sharp drop in the CAMEL rating may
indicate serious management or ﬁnancial problems and
may increase the risk of bank failure. Thus, we included
CAMEL change, which was measured by the change in
CAMEL rating from the previous quarter, to control for
this potential effect. All organizational-level variables
were measured quarterly.
Industry and Environmental Conditions. The number
of ﬁrms in an industry often determines the level of
competition, which inﬂuences the survival chance of the
ﬁrms in that industry. Thus, we included bank density
and bank density2. Because the majority of banks in our
sample operated in a single state during the study period,
we used the states to deﬁne the boundary of competition.
Bank density was operationalized as the total number of
banks that operated in the state in which the focal bank
was located in a given quarter.8
Macroeconomic conditions and social environments
can also have a substantial impact on a ﬁrm’s survival.
We included unemployment rate and personal income,
which were measured respectively by the unemployment
rate and the per capita average personal income of the
state in which the focal bank is located, to control for
the general economic conditions of a focal bank’s geo-
graphic market. During the study period, many bank
failures were attributed to unfavorable shifts in the real
estate market (Freund et al. 1997), so we controlled for
potential effects of the real estate market by including
the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fidu-
ciaries (NCREIF) Property Index, which represents a
measure of real estate performance calculated quarterly,
based on the total rate of return of investment in com-
mercial real estate properties acquired in the private mar-
ket for investment purposes. These three variables were
all measured at the state level because most banks in
the sample operated in a single state. Bank prime loan
rate, the base rate on corporate loans posted by at least
75% of the nation’s 30 largest banks, was also included
to control for the effects of overall ﬁnancial market
conditions.
Finally, we included calendar time to rule out any
potential effect of time trends. Calendar time was mea-
sured by the number of months that have passed since
January 1, 1984, the starting time of this study, until the
time of the focal observation.
Operating Experience. Operating experience has been
recognized as an important source of learning, and ample
empirical evidence exists to show that it can inﬂuence
ﬁrm performance (Argote and Epple 1990). A ﬁrm’s
operating experience can be measured by its cumulative
experience associated with its core activities. In the com-
mercial banking context, loans are the most important
portion of business for most banks, and the bulk of oper-
ation activities are either directly or indirectly related
to loans, including securing funds for loans, and selling
and managing loans (Hebeka 2005). Hence, the amount
of loans a bank has made since its charter is a good
proxy of the bank’s total operating experience. Operat-
ing experience was operationalized as the discounted (by
age) sum of the total dollar value of loans that a bank
made since its charter. Prior studies argue that a very
high level of operating experience may actually harm
ﬁrms’ performance by leading them into a competency
trap (Baum and Ingram 1998). Thus, we included oper-
ating experience and its squared term in our models.
Congenital Industry-Level Experience. Firms can
learn not only from the contemporary experience they
have acquired since their founding but also from the
stock of experience that has accrued within an industry
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before their birth, often referred to as congenital expe-
rience (Argote 1999, Huber 1991). We included con-
genital failure experience, which was measured by the
discounted (by age) sum of the total number of bank fail-
ures in the same state in which the focal bank operated
since 1934 (the year in which FDIC was established)
to the year before the focal bank was founded. We also
included congenital operating experience, which prox-
ies the amount of knowledge that the banking industry
has accumulated through normal operations. This was
measured by the discounted (by age) sum of the total
amount of loans made by all the banks in the same state
in which the focal bank operated since 1966, the year
state level loan data became available, to the year before
the focal bank was founded.
Industry-Level Failure and Recovery Experience.
Banks can learn from observing the experience of other
banks. Industry failure experience was operationalized
as the discounted (by age) sum of the total number
of bank failures in the same state in which the focal
bank operated since a focal bank’s founding. We also
included industry recovery experience, which was mea-
sured by the discounted (by age) sum of the total num-
ber of recovery events that all of the banks in the same
state in which the focal bank operated since a focal
bank’s founding. These industry-level variables have
been shown previously to inﬂuence survival-enhancing
learning (Kim and Miner 2007), making them important
to control for in this study of a ﬁrm’s own experience.
To check if our ﬁndings are sensitive to the choice
of control variables, we performed extensive sensitiv-
ity analysis by including different combinations of both
the current control variables and alternative control vari-
ables. Our core ﬁndings were insensitive to the choice
of control variables.
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and a bivariate cor-
relation matrix for all study variables. The bivariate cor-
relation coefﬁcients among the variables are generally
in the low to moderate range. A low to moderate level
of multicollinearity does not cause a bias in parameter
estimation, although it may cause less-efﬁcient parame-
ter estimates by inﬂating standard errors, making it less
likely that statistically signiﬁcant results will appear in
some cases, and possibly causing instability in coef-
ﬁcients (Cohen and Cohen 1983, Greene 2003). To
address any potential multicollinearity concern, we cal-
culated variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) for all variables;
the average VIF was 5.53 for the model without inter-
action variables (Model 3, Table 2), and the individ-
ual VIFs ranged between 1.01 and 16.11. The higher
VIFs that exceed 10—one general rule of thumb for
assessing multicollinearity—were observed for the linear
and squared terms for our success and recovery vari-
able. The linear term and the squared term of a vari-
able are typically highly correlated. Because curvilinear
success and recovery experience effects represent key
theoretical predictions, we used both the linear and the
squared terms in the models. Finally, models including
multiplicative interaction terms typically show high lev-
els of collinearity. When the VIFs were calculated with
all of the interaction variables (Model 5), the average
VIF increased to 8.37, a value that does not raise seri-
ous concerns for multicollinearity. We estimated mod-
els using interactions of mean-centered variables as sug-
gested by Aiken and West (1991), and we obtained con-
sistent results. Furthermore, we did not detect instability
in regression coefﬁcients for the baseline and study vari-
able models when interaction variables were individually
added (Models 4 and 5).
Table 2 reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the
bank failure rate using the piecewise exponential model.
Signiﬁcance tests shown in the table are two-tailed for
all variables. The baseline model contains all of the
control variables. Research variables (i.e., success expe-
rience, recovery experience, and their squared terms)
were hierarchically added to Models 1–3. Model 4 adds
the linear interaction between success experience and
recovery experience hierarchically to Model 3. Model 5
presents the fully saturated model with all four possible
combinations of interactions between success experience
and recovery experience. It is useful to keep in mind that
because the baseline model controls for the time since an
organization was born, the experience variables capture
experience itself and are not a proxy for age. Because the
effects of time since founding, then, are already factored
into the models, the results for experience do not simply
represent the impact of the new ﬁrms getting older.
Success Experience. Hypothesis 1 predicted that suc-
cess experience will ﬁrst increase failure but that above
a certain level it will decrease it, creating an inverted
U-shaped relationship between success experience and
the failure rates. This prediction was supported. The
coefﬁcient for success experience is positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant in all of the models, and its squared
term is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all of the
models except Model 3. That is, success at ﬁrst increases
the likelihood of mortality and then decreases it. Because
the hierarchical models with interaction terms led to bet-
ter model ﬁt, Model 3, without the interaction terms,
is underspeciﬁed. Thus, we used the saturated model
for assessment of its total effect. The data range of
success experience was between 0 and 4.61, and the
inﬂection point lies at 2.79. To determine whether the
quadratic effects we observed occurred at a meaningful
value, we calculated the inﬂection point and estimated
its 95% conﬁdence interval. The symmetric 95% conﬁ-
dence interval for the inﬂection point for success experi-
ence is between 2.20 and 3.39, which is well within the
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Age 0–4 years 043 049
2 Age 4–9 years 040 049 −071
3 Age >9 years 017 037 −039 −037
4 Calendar time (Months) 10876 4494 −047 013 045
5 Bank size (log[$000]) 1073 116 −030 014 021 040
6 Charter type 038 048 001 −002 002 −015 −004
7 Capital asset ratio 015 117 004 −003 −002 −001 −005 001
8 CAMEL rating 470 125 −008 −003 014 032 022 −014 −003
9 CAMEL change −019 2811 −007 005 002 003 003 000 000 011
10 High CAMEL failure 001 008 003 −001 −003 −008 000 004 002 −001
11 Bank density 47040 44857 015 −008 −009 −040 −026 028 −001 −027
12 Bank density2 (/1,000) 42248 81504 020 −012 −011 −042 −023 027 000 −027
13 Unemployment rate (%) 593 158 010 005 −019 −042 −016 014 −001 −001
14 Personal income ($000) 2043 430 −036 010 034 078 040 −017 −001 −001
15 Bank prime loan rate (%) 833 140 020 −017 −004 −030 −013 006 001 −014
16 NCREIF index 145 181 −006 −017 029 036 012 −002 001 014
17 Congenital failure exp 844 2124 003 000 −004 003 008 006 −001 −001
18 Congenital operating exp ($B) 18000 20500 −001 001 001 005 008 005 −000 000
19 Industry failure exp 2147 4574 −020 017 003 −009 −007 022 −002 −018
20 Industry recovery exp 8798 9215 −032 016 021 003 −004 023 −004 −008
21 Operating experience 037 363 −004 002 002 007 036 005 000 004
22 Operating experience2 1329 70270 −001 001 −000 002 012 002 000 001
23 Success experience 082 108 −016 −001 022 033 019 −012 001 039
24 Success experience2 184 348 −020 003 024 032 021 −010 001 032
25 Recovery experience 010 022 −014 009 007 005 001 004 −002 001
26 Recovery experience2 006 021 −006 005 001 001 −001 003 −001 −003
27 Success exp ∗ recovery exp 004 011 −016 002 019 014 006 000 −001 015
28 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp 006 021 −017 000 023 017 009 −001 −001 017
29 Success exp ∗ recovery exp2 001 007 −004 001 005 003 −001 000 000 005
30 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp2 001 009 −005 000 007 004 001 000 000 008
Table 1 (cont’d.)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
10 High CAMEL failure 000
11 Bank density (11,000) 000 −001
12 Bank density2 (/1,000) 000 000 095
13 Unemployment rate (by state) −001 −001 036 037
14 Personal income (by state) 001 −005 −040 −040 −036
15 Bank prime loan rate −002 004 013 013 −023 −020
16 NCREIF index (by state) 002 −001 −012 −010 −040 030 029
17 Congenital failure exp 002 −002 028 020 008 −003 −002 −001
18 Congenital operating exp −001 −003 022 017 028 027 −003 000 015
19 Industry failure exp 003 −002 012 038 021 −016 004 −012 025 019
20 Industry recovery exp 003 −003 061 043 018 −007 −010 −005 030 020 077
21 Operating experience 001 000 −003 −002 −004 006 −001 004 010 000 001
22 Operating experience2 000 000 −001 000 −002 001 000 002 003 000 000
23 Success experience 000 003 −018 −017 −022 023 −006 021 005 −002 −010
24 Success experience2 000 002 −015 −014 −019 021 −005 020 005 −003 −007
25 Recovery experience 023 −002 003 001 002 003 −006 −001 000 000 008
26 Recovery experience2 025 −001 003 002 002 000 −004 −002 000 000 005
27 Success exp ∗ recovery exp 019 000 −001 −002 −007 009 −005 008 005 −001 004
28 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp 011 000 −002 −003 −010 011 −004 011 006 −003 003
29 Success exp ∗ recovery exp2 027 000 001 001 −001 002 −002 002 019 001 002
30 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp2 022 001 001 001 −002 003 −001 004 003 −000 002
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Table 1 (cont’d.)
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
21 Operating experience 000
22 Operating experience2 000 082
23 Success experience −004 006 002
24 Success experience2 −001 006 001 095
25 Recovery experience 012 −001 −001 −019 −016
26 Recovery experience2 006 −001 000 −016 −013 094
27 Success exp ∗ recovery exp 010 001 000 026 018 036 026
28 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp 010 002 000 039 034 016 007 089
29 Success exp ∗ recovery exp2 003 000 000 004 000 045 044 079 052
30 Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp2 004 000 000 012 007 027 024 082 070 089
Table 2 Piecewise Exponential Estimation of Bank Failure N = 63036
Variable Baseline Model 1 Model 2
Period & calendar time
Age 0–4 year 03562 (0.541) 03813 (0.542) 03883 (0.556)
Age 4–9 year 09231∗ (0.492) 09082∗ (0.493) 08600∗ (0.513)
Age >9 year −34113∗∗ (1.538) −34472∗∗ (1.553) −49915∗∗∗(1.586)
Calendar time 00040 (0.005) 00015 (0.005) −00034 (0.005)
Organizational-level control variables
Bank size −03558∗∗∗(0.100) −03250∗∗∗(0.098) −02130∗ (0.112)
Charter type 02585∗ (0.146) 03357∗∗ (0.149) 02510∗ (0.144)
Capital asset ratio −00071 (0.030) −00078 (0.031) 00245∗ (0.015)
CAMEL rating −09616∗∗∗(0.047) −11927∗∗∗(0.071) −08963∗∗∗(0.051)
CAMEL change −00003 (0.004) 00020 (0.003) −00097∗∗∗(0.003)
High CAMEL failure 19999∗∗∗(0.270) 19053∗∗∗(0.269) 44484∗∗∗(0.335)
Industry & environment control variables (all measured by state except for bank prime loan rate)
Bank density −00004 (0.001) −00001 (0.001) 00020∗∗ (0.001)
Bank density2 00001 (0.000) 00000 (0.000) −00007∗ (0.000)
Unemployment rate 01218∗∗ (0.053) 01144∗∗ (0.055) 00114 (0.054)
Personal income 00453 (0.031) 00458 (0.031) 00231 (0.028)
Bank prime loan rate 00329 (0.058) 00065 (0.058) −01361∗∗ (0.061)
NCREIF index −01370∗∗∗(0.037) −01343∗∗∗(0.037) −00271 (0.038)
Congenital experience
Congenital failure experience 00106∗∗∗(0.002) 00105∗∗∗(0.002) 00187∗∗∗(0.002)
Congenital operating experience −00001 (0.001) −00001 (0.001) 00004 (0.001)
Industry-level experience
Industry failure experience 00010 (0.002) 00013 (0.002) 00039∗∗ (0.002)
Industry recovery experience −00004 (0.002) −00008 (0.002) −00089∗∗∗(0.002)
Own operating experience
Operating experience 19510∗∗∗(0.744) 15610∗∗ (0.662) 13752∗ (0.741)
Operating experience2 −04726 (0.291) −03519 (0.222) −03437 (0.240)
Own success and recovery experience
Success experience 20551∗∗∗(0.410)
Success experience2 −03641∗∗∗(0.122)
Recovery experience 97304∗∗∗(1.272)
Recovery experience2 −41957∗∗∗(1.142)
Interaction terms
Success exp ∗ recovery exp
Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp
Success exp ∗ recovery exp2
Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp2
Log Likelihood −1312679 −1292662 −836482
Likelihood ratio test 2a 40.034∗∗∗ 912.36∗∗∗
Akaike information criteria 695.823 659.788 −252573
Bayesian information criteria 885.903 867.972 −44389
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Table 2 (cont’d.)
Variable Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Period & Calendar time
Age 0–4 year 05365 (0.564) 02442 (0.560) 02428 (0.559)
Age 4–9 year 08967∗ (0.518) 06954 (0.516) 06969 (0.515)
Age >9 year −66290∗∗∗(1.650) −69080∗∗∗(1.664) −68111∗∗∗(1.672)
Calendar time −00021 (0.005) −00010 (0.005) −00010 (0.005)
Organizational-level control variables
Bank size −01002 (0.115) −01172 (0.116) −01330 (0.118)
Charter type 03159∗∗ (0.146) 02797∗ (0.145) 02771∗ (0.145)
Capital asset ratio 00254∗ (0.015) 00298∗∗ (0.015) 00301∗∗ (0.015)
CAMEL rating −10848∗∗∗(0.067) −12298∗∗∗(0.084) −12156∗∗∗(0.084)
CAMEL change −00078∗∗∗(0.003) −00032 (0.003) −00031 (0.003)
High CAMEL failure 44209∗∗∗(0.352) 46571∗∗∗(0.369) 47075∗∗∗(0.374)
Industry & environment control variables (all measured by state except for bank prime loan rate)
Bank density 00029∗∗∗(0.001) 00035∗∗∗(0.001) 00036∗∗∗(0.001)
Bank density2 −00010∗∗∗(0.000) −00013∗∗∗(0.000) −00013∗∗∗(0.000)
Unemployment rate 00056 (0.056) 00150 (0.053) 00179 (0.053)
Personal income 00121 (0.028) 00122 (0.028) 00135 (0.028)
Bank prime loan rate −01281∗∗ (0.061) −01418∗∗ (0.060) −01466∗∗ (0.060)
NCREIF index −00258 (0.038) −00306 (0.038) −00292 (0.038)
Congenital experience
Congenital failure experience 00171∗∗∗(0.002) 00187∗∗∗(0.002) 00189∗∗∗(0.002)
Congenital operating experience 00003 (0.001) 00002 (0.001) 00002 (0.001)
Industry-level experience
Industry failure experience 00045∗∗∗(0.002) 00043∗∗ (0.002) 00044∗∗ (0.002)
Industry recovery experience −00111∗∗∗(0.002) −00124∗∗∗(0.002) −00127∗∗∗(0.002)
Own operating experience
Operating experience 10271 (0.743) 12890∗ (0.736) 13418∗ (0.741)
Operating experience2 −02802 (0.207) −03506∗ (0.209) −03628∗ (0.213)
Own success and recovery experience
Success experience 15295∗∗∗(0.402) 44082∗∗∗(0.645) 44179∗∗∗(0.654)
Success experience2 −00279 (0.116) −07789∗∗∗(0.180) −07910∗∗∗(0.188)
Recovery experience 100546∗∗∗(1.328) 124729∗∗∗(1.522) 132515∗∗∗(1.864)
Recovery experience2 −41946∗∗∗(1.200) −58422∗∗∗(1.354) −65993∗∗∗(1.699)
Interaction terms
Success exp ∗ recovery exp −40990∗∗∗(0.749) −70876 (6.916)
Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp 14832 (2.740)
Success exp ∗ recovery exp2 39142 (6.464)
Success exp2 ∗ recovery exp2 −32963 (3.149)
Log Likelihood −804922 −788891 −788153
Likelihood ratio test 2a 63.12∗∗∗ 32.062∗∗∗ 1.476
Likelihood ratio test 2b 32.062∗∗∗ 33.538∗∗∗
Akaike information criteria −311692 −341753 −337229
Bayesian information criteria −85405 −106415 −74737
Notes. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
aThe likelihood ratio tests were performed based on the comparisons with the immediate preceding models.
bThe likelihood ratio tests for Models 4 and 5 contrast these models with Model 3, which contains no interaction term.
∗p < 01; ∗∗p < 005; ∗∗∗p < 001. All signiﬁcant tests are two-tailed.
sample data range (0–4.61). Thus, the curvilinear effects
we observed were not an artifact of extrapolating the
model (Weesie 2001).
Recovery Experience. Hypothesis 2 predicted that
recovery experience will also initially increase failure
but then reduce it, generating an inverted U-shaped
effect on the failure rates of the sample banks. The coef-
ﬁcient for recovery experience is positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, and its squared term is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in all models, including the fully
saturated model and all other models examining inter-
action effects. The inﬂection point for recovery experi-
ence was 1.00, which is within the sample data range
(0–1.41), with the 95% conﬁdence interval covering the
range from 0.77 to 1.24. This indicates that the curvi-
linear effects occurred at a meaningful value that falls
within the range of our sample values (Weesie 2001).
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Interaction Between Success and Recovery Expe-
rience. Testing an interaction between variables with
higher-order effects is complex, and there is a debate
about the appropriate methods of modeling higher-order
interaction effects (Aiken and West 1991). The inter-
action effect between success experience and recovery
experience can be tested in two ways: (1) capturing the
total effect of the interaction by including all possible
combinations of the two variables, and (2) interpreting
the interaction based only on the interaction terms that
signiﬁcantly contribute to model improvement.
The ﬁrst method involves including all four possible
combinations of the variables (success experience ∗
recovery experience SR, success experience2 ∗
recovery experience S2R, success experience∗recovery
experience2 SR2, and success experience2 ∗ recovery
experience2 S2R2) to capture the total effect of the
interaction. The signiﬁcance of the overall interaction
effect can be determined by performing the likelihood
ratio test for all four terms together. The likelihood
ratio test indicated that adding the four interaction
terms (Model 5) signiﬁcantly improved model ﬁt over
the model with no interaction terms—Model 3 2 =
33	538. This indicates that the combined effect of the
interaction terms has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on
bank failure rates.
Although comparing the combined effect of interac-
tion terms added to a model represents a standard way
to assess an interaction effect, one difﬁculty associated
with this approach is that it is not always possible to
distinguish empirically between the various component
effects, in part because of a set of highly collinear inter-
action terms added to the same model. Thus, we also
explored the interaction using an alternative approach
based on the inclusion of only the variables that signiﬁ-
cantly contribute to the improvement of model ﬁt (Aiken
and West 1991).9
To explore the contribution of individual interaction
terms, we hierarchically added the all possible com-
binations of interaction terms between success experi-
ence and recovery experience, starting from only the
linear interaction term in Models 4. The results indi-
cated that (1) the linear interaction term (SR) accounted
for much of the variance explained by the addition of
the bundle of interaction terms, and (2) other interac-
tion terms made very little contribution to the overall
model ﬁt. Model 4 that includes only the linear interac-
tion term shows a statistically signiﬁcant improvement
over Model 3, which contains no interaction term. How-
ever, adding other three interaction terms—i.e., S2R,
SR2, and S2R2—does not generate statistically signiﬁ-
cant improvements over Model 4. This supports using
coefﬁcients in Model 4 to evaluate the interaction effect.
As an additional probe, we used two information criteria
diagnostics—the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)—to explore model
Figure 1 The Interaction Effects Between Success and
Recovery Experience on Bank Failure Rates
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parsimony (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Model 4 in
Table 2 has a lower score for both AIC (−341.753) and
BIC (−106.415) than Model 5, implying that Model 4
is a more parsimonious model without losing explana-
tory power, further supporting the use of Model 4 for
analysis of interaction effects.
To help interpret the interaction effect of the suc-
cess and recovery experience on bank failure rates, we
visually depict Mode 4’s joint multiplier effects of suc-
cess experience and recovery experience in Figure 1.10
The vertical axis is the natural log of the multiplier of
the hazard rate of bank failure, and the horizontal axes
represent success experience and recovery experience,
respectively. Figure 1 indicates that the hazard rate of
bank failure is lowest when the levels of both success
experience and recovery experience are high, a ﬁnding
that is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Figure 1 illustrates
that the impacts of success and recovery experience
are not merely additive, but that the impact of each is
enhanced by the presence of the other. The multiplicative
interaction effects can be further probed by considering
how each type of experience alters the inﬂection point
at which the other type begins to enhance rather than
reduce survival. The inﬂection point of recovery expe-
rience decreases from 1.00 when ﬁrms have no success
experience to 0.63 when ﬁrms are assumed to have a
mean level of success experience (=0.71)	 The inﬂec-
tion point of success experience decreases from 2.79 in
absence of recovery experience to 2.40 with the mean
level of recovery experience of 0.09. In each case, then,
the presence of the other type reduces the level of expe-
rience needed to produce survival enhancing learning.
As a robustness check, we also created a graph that
depicted the joint multiplier effects based on the full
model (Model 5), which contains all four combinations
of success experience and recovery experience. This
graph provided consistent in-sample predictions with
Figure 1.
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Discussion
Summary of Findings
In this paper, we theorized that two different types of
a ﬁrm’s own experience inﬂuence survival-enhancing
learning. We hypothesized that, in the presence of lit-
tle experience of the same type, success and recovery
experience can produce harmful learning outcomes, but
that increased levels of the same type of experience will
generate useful learning. Furthermore, we argued that
each type of experience would enhance the value of the
other. Overall, our results are consistent with this con-
tingency model of when and how success and recovery
will produce valued learning outcomes. Our framework
offers a more complete vision of their learning impact
than standard models that imply that more experience
leads monotonically and independently to higher learn-
ing value.
We proposed that prior experience of the same type
will shape each type’s impact because—in the absence
of prior success or recovery experience—low levels
of each will tend to generate harmful learning out-
comes. Flawed inferences from a small number of
extreme performance outcomes, superstitious learning,
and the development of inaccurate models of organi-
zational action will lead to potentially harmful actions
and strategies (Argote 1999, Cyert and March 1992,
March and Olsen 1976). In addition, the high salience
and appeal of these forms of experience (Haunschild and
Miner 1997) will exacerbate this danger. Further expe-
rience of the same type, however, can overcome these
dangers by providing contrasts across different episodes
and periods of success or recovery events and by cre-
ating a more valid and comprehensive understanding of
prior experience, which in turn increases the chances of
survival-enhancing action.
The results support this vision of the importance
of foundational experience before useful learning can
occur. Our results are consistent with prior theory that
emphasizes the difﬁculties and dangers of interpreting
low levels of experience and making use of raw experi-
ence to guide signiﬁcant action (March et al. 1991). Our
results are also consistent with the construct of absorp-
tive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990)—in which
some experience makes possible the interpretation of
other experience—and the importance of organizational
memory (Moorman and Miner 1997, Walsh and Ungson
1991) in gaining value from new experience. Our results
indicate that after a certain level, additional experience
can become useful even if the low levels were harm-
ful. In contrast to prior work that found that in some
cases experience may have little impact (Van de Ven and
Polley 1992), this study explicates and ﬁnds evidence
for harmful impact of experience. Finally, the pattern
of our results contrasts with Baum and Ingram’s (1998)
ﬁnding of a U-shaped relationship between operating
experience and ﬁrm failure rates in the Manhattan hotel
industry. This discrepancy may have arisen from the dif-
ferences between operating experience and the types of
experience we study here. This is an important issue that
deserves further attention.
The second theoretical prediction—that the joint pres-
ence of both success and recovery experience enhances
their separate learning value—was also supported. This
is consistent with the emerging emphasis on variability
as a source for useful learning in general (Haunschild
and Sullivan 2002), but advances it beyond information
sources into the realm of direct experience. The com-
bination of success and recovery had more value than
either experience alone, which is consistent with inferen-
tial learning involving schematic or causal models devel-
oped within the organization (March et al. 1991) and
the selective retention and elaboration of behaviors from
a highly varied pool of actions and outcomes (Levitt
and March 1988). The combination of both types of
experience offers richer and contrasting experience from
which to draw more valid inferences, can help reduce the
dangers of potential learning errors and biases, and can
provide more complete action templates. Our theoretical
approach underscores conditions under which two types
of experience should complement rather than substitute
for each other’s value (Haunschild and Beckman 1998,
Schwab 2007).
Our ﬁndings, then, support our theoretical framework,
which proposes that both success and recovery experi-
ence will distinctly affect survival-enhancing learning in
ﬁrms and that their impacts will depend upon the amount
of experience and the presence of each other. Our frame-
work implies that either additional experience of a given
type or the presence of the other type can help overcome
obstacles to useful learning at low levels of success and
recovery experience. Beyond the support for this frame-
work, one other feature of our results seems especially
interesting.
Our results also offer interesting insights into the level
of success and recovery experience required to gener-
ate positive survival-enhancing learning in our sample.
First, the presence of each type meaningfully increased
the value of the other. As reported, an average amount
of success experience reduced the amount of experi-
ence needed before which recovery experience enhances
survival by 37% (from 1.00 to 0.63). An average level
of recovery experience reduced the comparable point
for success experience by 14% (from 2.79 to 2.40).
Second, although the two variables cannot be directly
compared because they are measured in different units,
an informal contrast raises the possibility that recovery
may be more valuable than success. A discounted sum
of approximately three (2.79) success experiences, in
contrast to just one discounted sum of recovery experi-
ences (1.00), was required to produce positive survival-
enhancing learning. This informal contrast matches argu-
ments that recovery experience provides special value
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through enhancing both action learning and opportuni-
ties for valid inferences (Kim and Miner 2007, March
et al. 1991) with less danger of promoting complacency.
Further work could usefully test theoretical predictions
about what drives the “turning point” beyond which
additional units of varied types of experience provide
value.
Limitations and Future Research
Our work leaves several key questions for further
research. It would be beneﬁcial to study the impact of
success and recovery experience in other industry set-
tings, with an eye to identifying scope conditions for the
causal factors we developed. In particular, the banking
industry is regulated, typically with lower failure rates
than some other industries. A future study exploring
the impact of these types of experiences in a nonregu-
lated industry and/or high-failure setting would deepen
our understanding. Studies in different empirical con-
texts could also provide further insights on the different
ﬁndings for the effect of operating experience between
this paper and prior work (e.g., Baum and Ingram 1998).
One strength of this study is its focus on a cohort of new
ﬁrms, which allowed us to examine and accurately mea-
sure prior success and recovery from the ﬁrm’s found-
ing. Future research, however, could usefully explore
whether the impact of these two of different types of
experience will differ in longstanding organizations.
Our theoretical predictions and analyses also involved
interactions between variables for which we predicted
and found curvilinear effects. This is one of the early
studies that explore the interaction effect of two different
performance experience types, and to our knowledge it is
the only one that addresses such curvilinear interactions.
Further work could explore other interactions, includ-
ing both types and levels of organizational experience
(e.g., internal experience and external, or industry-level,
experience) (Schwab 2007). In the tradition of learn-
ing research that looks at long-term learning outcomes
rather than measuring individual learning processes, this
study did not directly measure the behavioral changes
or changes in the ﬁrms’ causal maps, although we did
challenge the feasibility of some hypothesized processes
in our qualitative work. Continuing ﬁne-grained process
research and systematic studies of the microsteps theo-
rized here will have clear value.
In theorizing about the impact of recovery experi-
ence, we emphasized two speciﬁc aspects: the transition
from a distress experience to recovery, and the combi-
nation of contrasting information. Our study opens the
door to important additional issues related to recovery.
These include the potential impact of the duration of
recovery, and of other failure-related experience types
such as consecutive performance declines or perfor-
mance declines that are not associated with a speciﬁc
performance threshold. On the other hand, we measured
success as the accumulated history of high-performance
periods, but success can be also measured alternatively.
In particular, transition to and from success may produce
useful organizational learning just like recovery experi-
ence. Future studies that examine different types of suc-
cess experience will be valuable.
Finally, we examined the impact of success and recov-
ery experience using the survival-enhancing learning
framework. Future research on the impact of these expe-
riences on other important organizational outcomes (e.g.,
growth, search behavior, changes in top executives, or
strategic choices such as product mix or mergers and
acquisitions) will advance understanding.
Implications for Broader Theory
Theories of Organizational Learning. Our work has
important implications for organization learning research
more broadly. Our pattern of results reinforces the vision
of an ecology of internal organizational experience and
learning processes that involves distinct constraints and
internal interactions (March 1999a). Recent studies sug-
gest that ﬁrms can learn from different types of experi-
ence, such as train accidents (Baum and Dahlin 2007),
product recall (Haunschild and Rhee 2004), or improvi-
sational activities in product development (Miner et al.
2001). For the most part, each type of learning experi-
ence tends to be treated as independent of other types
of experience. However, our study theorizes about spe-
ciﬁc ways that two important types of experience will
interact with each other. In our context, the two oppo-
site types of experience interact to mitigate the harmful
learning effects that can occur when organizations have
only a small sample of such experience. This advances
the understanding of ecologies of experience in several
ways. First, different types of organizational experience
can work through different learning processes (Argote
et al. 2003, Schulz 2002). Our arguments posited that
ﬁrms learn through changes in both activities and in
cognitive maps (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000, Miner and
Mezias 1996), which highlights these learning channels.
Although important simulations have revealed intrigu-
ing possibilities for ecologies of learning processes and
levels (Lant and Mezias 1992), systematic tests of such
interactions within organizations have presented research
challenges. Our work proposes and tests a concrete
framework for how different types of internal experience
interact with each other and shape survival-enhancing
learning. Our results indicate a speciﬁc pattern for an
ecology of internal learning not previously explicated or
tested.
In addition, we call attention to a ﬁrm’s own recovery
experience as an important potential driver of learning.
Although prior work has considered the general idea
of rebounding from threats of failure, it has typically
focused on the recovery ending itself as the key depen-
dent variable. In contrast, our study systematically tests
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the impact of the ﬁrm’s own recovery experiences as
an independent variable and the impact of this variable
on an organizational outcome—in this case, survival.
Kim and Miner (2007) studied industry-level near-failure
experience in the banking industry, a construct similar
to recovery experience but operationalized at the indus-
try level. Their results support their theory that ﬁrms
can learn vicariously from the industry-level near-failure
experience, and our baseline model incorporates their
ﬁndings. Our paper represents a major advance over this
prior work by addressing the impact of internal expe-
rience. Taken together, this body of work implies that
recovery experiences, whether one’s own or others’, rep-
resent signiﬁcant drivers of survival-enhancing learning.
Entrepreneurship Research. Because we focus on
learning in the presence of little experience of a given
type, our theory and results clearly have implications
for understanding processes within new ﬁrms. Our
sample consists of new ﬁrms, and our study deepens
understanding of the most common type of new ﬁrm:
those created in an existing industry (Aldrich 2005,
p. 469). It advances entrepreneurship research by pro-
viding new theory and large-scale empirical evidence on
how entrepreneurial ﬁrms can learn from their own inter-
nal experience after founding.
Researchers have previously emphasized learning by
individual founders and founding teams (Aldrich and
Ruef 2006, Baker et al. 2002, Minniti and Bygrave
2001, Ruef et al. 2003). They draw on outside experts
(Ruef 2002), prior personal experience (Shane 2000),
industrywide norms (Klepper 2002), or a parent ﬁrm’s
existing practices (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990).
Other theories emphasize even broader inﬂuences such
as ethnic communities or national legal structures
(Schoonhoven and Romanelli 2001). Our study refo-
cuses attention on a ﬁrm’s own internal experience after
founding, and emphasizes systematic patterns based on
internal organization-level experience rather than on
individual-level experience (Baker et al. 2002). In short,
it concerns organizational entrepreneurial learning. Our
theory implies that the pattern of ﬁrm-level success- and
failure-related experience can affect survival itself, and it
suggests that extreme success- and failure-related expe-
riences will have survival value only after an experiential
threshold has been achieved. This contrasts with assump-
tions that a new ﬁrm starts with an unconstrained ability
to learn and import knowledge. Instead, our framework
underscores the criticality of some degree of experience
before further experience actually provides value (Gong
et al. 2006).
Conclusion
Overall, our theoretical framework and results paint
an intriguing portrait of learning related to organiza-
tional success and recovery experience. Both forms of
experience can produce dysfunctional and useful learn-
ing processes, with each having value only after a
critical threshold of experience of the same type has
been acquired. The two different types of experience
can enhance each other’s value in survival-enhancing
learning, providing another way to overcome dangers
of low levels of experience. A new ﬁrm’s survival is
a prerequisite for its own potential growth and helps
shape the direction of industry evolution. Our ﬁndings,
then, open a promising early window into organiza-
tional entrepreneurial learning and the broader domain
of ecologies of organization-level experience and learn-
ing outcomes.
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Endnotes
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for these helpful comments
and suggestions.
2Interview conducted in May 2006. Most interview quotes
used in this study were drawn directly from actual quotes with
minimum editing. Some interviews were conducted in a for-
eign language, and were translated into English.
3Interview conducted in June 2006.
4Interview conducted in December 2005.
5The speciﬁc details of IDC’s form of CAMEL ratings are
proprietary but designed to approximate the FDIC CAMEL
ratings. The ﬁve components of the CAMEL rating are as
calculated based on the following: (1) capital risk measures
credit and interest rate risk, and is determined by Tier 1 capi-
tal as a percentage of assets and as a percentage of risk-based
assets; (2) asset quality is measured by the level of loan delin-
quency and nonperforming assets relative to loan loss reserves
and capital ratios; (3) margins measure management’s ﬁnan-
cial controls and are calculated by the spreads between vari-
ous proﬁtability indices such as interest income and expenses;
(4) earnings measure the success of the operating strategy and
are calculated by the net operating after-tax return on earning
assets; and (5) leverage measures the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial
strategy, and is determined by the degree of leverage, the cost
of leverage relative to operating returns, and liquidity.
6The FDIC CAMEL rating ranges from 1 (highest perfor-
mance) to 5 (lowest performance).
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful suggestion
on the log-transformation of the CAMEL rating.
8We estimated models using a density variable that was
adjusted by the state-level total gross domestic product to
account for the size of each market (i.e., state) and found con-
sistent results.
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9We thank the senior editor and an anonymous reviewer for
helpful comments on different approaches to testing these
interaction effects.
10The multiplier of the rate represents the risk of experiencing
events relative to the baseline hazard. The exponential haz-
ard rate is represented as rt = h0t expx, where h0t
is the baseline hazard rate and  is a vector of regression
coefﬁcients. Because h0t is identical for all variables in the
model, the relative effects between predictors can be assessed
by comparing the multiplier of the rate, expx, after setting
the multiplier to 1 for the baseline hazard rate.
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